Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/173424 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 266
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance evaluation is delegated to a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of the bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal determines a set of prizes to be allocated to the agents, is optimal. By using a contest, the principal can commit to sustaining incentives despite the reviewer's potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile can be uniquely implemented by an all-pay auction with a cap, and it can also be implemented by a nested Tullock contest. Our analysis has implications for applications as diverse as the design of worker compensation, the awarding of research grants, and the allocation of foreign aid.
Schlagwörter: 
Performance evaluation
delegation
optimality of contests
JEL: 
D02
D82
M52
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
798.17 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.