Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/173410 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 228
Versionsangabe: 
Revised version
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We show that a one-off incentive to bias advice has persistent effects. In an experiment, some advisers were paid a bonus to recommend a lottery which only risk-seeking individuals should choose to a less informed client. Afterwards, they had to choose for themselves and make a second recommendation to another client, without any bonus. These advisers choose the risky lottery and recommend it a second time up to six times more often than advisers in a control group who were never offered a bonus. These results are consistent with a theory we present which is based on advisers' image concerns of appearing incorruptible.
Schlagwörter: 
advice-giving
conflict of interest
self-signaling
self-deception
JEL: 
C91
D03
D83
G11
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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