Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/173138
Authors: 
Zhou, Jun
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Bruegel Working Paper 2016/02
Abstract: 
The authors study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1996 and 2014. The start of a Commission investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply for leniency in the market investigated, but increases the rate of application in separate markets in which a conspirator in the investigated market also engaged in collusion. The revision of the Commission’s leniency programme in 2002 increased the rate of pre-investigation applications. Our results shed light on enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of
Subjects: 
Leniency
Cartels
Collusion
Multi-Market Contact
Knock-on Effect of Investigation
Revelation of Undetected Cartels
JEL: 
D43
D84
K21
K42
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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