Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/173057
Authors: 
Cabrales, Antonio
Drouvelis, Michalis
Gurguy, Zeynep
Ray, Indrajit
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6781
Abstract: 
We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, allowing a possible round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk before the game is played. We compare different treatments to study truthful revelation of information and subsequent payoffs from the game. We find that the players are overall truthful about their types in the cheap-talk phase in both one-way or two-way talk. Furthermore, the unique symmetric cheap-talk equilibrium in the two-way cheap talk game is played when they players fully reveal their information; however, they achieve higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination.
Subjects: 
battle of the sexes
private information
cheap talk
coordination
JEL: 
C72
C92
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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