Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/173050
Authors: 
Gresik, Thomas A.
Konrad, Kai A.
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6774
Abstract: 
Tax havens differ in the specific tax planning arrangements multinational firms can use to reduce their tax liabilities. Given the complexity and cost associated with identifying the most effective tax haven to use, an accounting firm can act as an intermediary between tax havens and multinational corporations. We analyze a model with horizontally differentiated multinationals and tax havens to study the role accounting firm intermediation has on tax haven prices, multinational tax planning choices, accounting firm profits, and tax revenues. In equilibrium, uniform accounting firm fees generate higher accounting firm profit, less tax avoidance, and higher tax revenues than either full price discrimination or haven-specific fees.
Subjects: 
tax haven
accounting firm
horizontal differentiation
double marginalization
fee-setting rules
JEL: 
M41
H26
H73
F38
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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