Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/173023
Authors: 
Jetter, Michael
Li, Bei
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6747
Abstract: 
This paper proposes a simple framework to better understand an opposition group’s choice between peace, terrorism, and open civil conflict against the government. Our model implies that terrorism emerges if constraints on the ruling executive group are intermediate and rents are sizeable, whereas conflict looms under poor executive constraints. Analyzing annual data for up to 158 countries in a panel setting provides evidence consistent with these hypotheses. The results emerge both when considering the incidence and onset of terrorism and conflict. The corresponding magnitudes are economically sizeable. Overall, these findings can help us understand and anticipate the choices of opposition groups.
Subjects: 
conflict
executive constraints
foreign aid
natural resource rents
oil rents
political institutions
rents
terrorism
JEL: 
D74
F35
O11
P47
P48
Q34
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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