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Autoren: 
Gassebner, Martin
Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Arevik
Datum: 
2017
Reihe/Nr.: 
Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) 612
Zusammenfassung: 
While it is well understood that industrialized countries use aid to grant political favors, little research covers alternative channels such as trade policy towards developing countries. We analyze eligibility investigations and revoking of U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits to see whether political friends of the U.S. receive favorable treatment. While countries politically aligned with the U.S. are equally likely to be investigated, they are significantly less likely to have their benefits suspended.
Schlagwörter: 
Trade Policy
Development
Generalized System of Preferences
United Nations General Assembly
JEL: 
F13
F53
O19
O24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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