Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/172569
Authors: 
Hafezalkotob, Ashkan
Mahmoudi, Reza
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Industrial Engineering International [ISSN:] 2251-712X [Volume:] 13 [Year:] 2017 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 357-367
Abstract: 
Currently, many socially responsible governments adopt economic incentives and deterrents to manage environmental impacts of electricity suppliers. Considering the Stackelberg leadership of the government, the government's role in the competition of power plants in an electricity market is investigated. A one-population evolutionary game model of power plants is developed to study how their production strategy depends on tariffs levied by the government. We establish that a unique evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) for the population exists. Numerical examples demonstrate that revenue maximization and environment protection policies of the government significantly affect the production ESS of competitive power plants. The results reveal that the government can introduce a green energy source as an ESS of the competitive power plants by imposing appropriate tariffs.
Subjects: 
Evolutionary game theory
Green electricity
Power plant
Government intervention
Energy source selection
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.