Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171715
Authors: 
Gersbach, Hans
Tejada, Oriol
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series 17/272
Abstract: 
We introduce a two-stage, multiple-round voting procedure where the thresholds needed for approval require a qualified majority and vary with the proposal on the table. We apply such a procedure to instances of public-good provision where the citizens’ valuations can take two values and are private. We show that the procedure elicits and aggregates the information about the valuations and implements the utilitarian optimal public good level. This level is chosen after all potential socially optimal policies have been considered. We also develop a compound procedure to ensure utilitarian optimality when there are arbitrarily finitely many types of citizen.
Subjects: 
voting
utilitarianism
implementation
JEL: 
C72
D70
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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