Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171705
Authors: 
Abrell, Jan
Rausch, Sebastian
Schwarz, Giacomo A.
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series [16/262]
Abstract: 
This paper examines pollution tax differentiation across industries in light of social equity concerns using theoretical and numerical general equilibrium analyses in an optimal tax framework. We characterize the drivers for non-uniform optimal taxes emanating from the interaction of household heterogeneity with social preferences. Quantitatively assessing the case of price-based CO2 emissions control in the U.S. economy, we find that optimal carbon taxes differ largely across industries, even when social inequality aversion is low. Our results are robust with respect to the stringency of the environmental target, non-optimal redistribution schemes, and parametric uncertainty in firms’ and households’ equilibrium tax responses.
Subjects: 
Differentiated environmental taxes
Carbon pricing
Industries
Heterogeneous households
Social inequality
Optimal taxation
General equilibrium
JEL: 
H23
Q52
C68
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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