Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171678 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 16/235
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
A country's optimal environmental border policy includes a strategic component that is inconsistent with commitments under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). We extend the theory to include GATT compliance. Theory supports optimal border adjustments on carbon content that are below the domestic carbon price, because price signals sent through border adjustments encourage consumption of emissions intensive goods in unregulated regions. The theory is supported in our applied numeric simulations. Countries imposing border adjustments at the domestic carbon price will be extracting rents from unregulated regions at the expense of efficient environmental policy and consistency with international trade law.
Schlagwörter: 
climate policy
border tax adjustments
carbon leakage
trade and carbon taxes
JEL: 
F13
F18
Q54
Q56
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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