Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171664 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 15/221
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We model competition for a multi-attribute health service where patients observe attribute quality imprecisely before deciding on a provider. High quality in one attribute, e.g. medical quality, is more important for ex post utility than high quality in the other attribute. Providers can shift resources to increase expected quality in some attribute. Patients rationally focus on attributes depending on signal precision and beliefs about the providers’ resource allocations. When signal precision is such that patients focus on the less important attribute, any Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is inefficient. Increasing signal precision can reduce welfare, as the positive effect of better provider selection is overcompensated by the negative effect that a shift in patient focusing has on provider quality choice. We discuss the providers’ strategic reporting incentives and reporting policies. Under optimal reporting, signals about the important attribute are always published. However, banning reporting on less important attributes might be necessary.
Schlagwörter: 
multi-attribute good
quality signals
focusing
reporting
JEL: 
I11
D83
L10
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.41 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.