Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171656 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 15/213
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates competition among financial intermediaries in a finite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) economy under no aggregate uncertainty. The economy is populated by self-interested financial intermediaries that compete strategically over deposit contracts offered to consumers. Both exclusive and nonexclusive competition perspective are considered, in both cases multiple equilibria arise if banks do not have an initial endowment. When financial intermediaries have a sufficient level of endowment, regardless the competition perspective adopted, the first best allocation is the unique equilibrium allocation.
Schlagwörter: 
financial intermediation
deposit contracts
JEL: 
D82
G21
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.15 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.