Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171656
Authors: 
Larocca, Vittorio
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series 15/213
Abstract: 
This paper investigates competition among financial intermediaries in a finite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) economy under no aggregate uncertainty. The economy is populated by self-interested financial intermediaries that compete strategically over deposit contracts offered to consumers. Both exclusive and nonexclusive competition perspective are considered, in both cases multiple equilibria arise if banks do not have an initial endowment. When financial intermediaries have a sufficient level of endowment, regardless the competition perspective adopted, the first best allocation is the unique equilibrium allocation.
Subjects: 
financial intermediation
deposit contracts
JEL: 
D82
G21
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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