Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171620 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 13/177
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
Complementing the existing literature on anchoring effects and loss aversion, we analyze how firms can influence loss–averse consumers’ willingness to pay by product information in the form of informative advertising rather than by prices. We find that consumers’ willingness to pay is greatest when only partial information about the product—i.e. only a fraction of product attributes—is disclosed, and that partial information disclosure is the optimal mode of advertising for a monopolistic firm. This causes the consumers’ realized product valuation to diverge from their intrinsic product valuation, which leads to a reduction of consumer surplus. Consequently, transparency policies can help to protect consumers.
Schlagwörter: 
Advertising
Loss Aversion
Information Disclosure
JEL: 
D83
L41
M37
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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