Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171569
Authors: 
Schneider, Maik T.
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series 10/126
Abstract: 
We develop a model of legislative lobbying where policy proposals are endogenous. We show that a policy proposer with preferences tilted towards one lobby may be induced by an increase in that interest group's size to propose policies geared towards the opposing lobby. Hence, a larger lobby size can have adverse effects on policy outcomes for this same lobby. This provides another rationale as to why some interests do not organize. Moreover, we find that a second-mover advantage in Groseclose and Snyder (1996)-type lobbying models with exogenous policy proposals can turn into a second-mover disadvantage when the proposal is endogenous.
Subjects: 
legislative lobbying
vote buying
legislatures
interest groups
political economy
JEL: 
D72
P16
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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