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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 09/122
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We propose a signaling model in which the central bank and firms receive information on cost-push shocks independently from each other. If the firms’ signals are rather unlikely to be informative, central banks should remain silent about their own private signals. If, however, firms are sufficiently likely to be informed, it is socially desirable for the central bank to reveal its private information. By doing so, the central bank eliminates the distortions stemming from the signaling incentives under opacity. Our model may also explain the recent trend towards more transparency in monetary policy.
Schlagwörter: 
signaling games
transparency
monetary policy
central banks
communication
JEL: 
D82
D83
E58
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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