Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171546 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 09/103
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
Individual terrorist are frequently behaving seemingly absurd, e.g. by carrying out suicide operations, while activities of the terrorist organisations as a whole often seem to be conducted in a very effective way. These facts caused many researchers to regard the leaders representing the organisations like rational entities, while the followers are supposed to be just obeying and, hence, to be irrational. In this paper we offer a different approach which postulates rationality of all involved agents. We demonstrate how these agents’ behaviour could be modelled, while taking into account options of the terrorist leaders to influence their followers. From our model approaches to counter terrorism on both the leadership as well as the follower level can be derived.
Schlagwörter: 
cognitive dissonance
joint production
Lancastrian characteristics approach
public goods
rationality
suicide attacks
terrorism
JEL: 
D74
D69
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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