Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171537 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 08/94
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
Vote-buying is widely used by parties in developing countries to influence the outcome of elections. We examine the impact of vote-buying on growth. We consider a model with a poverty trap where redistribution can promote growth. We show that vote-buying contributes to the persistence of poverty as taxed wealthy people buy votes from poor people. We then show that there exists a democratic constitution that breaks vote buying and promotes growth. Such a constitution involves rotating agenda setting, a taxpayer-protection rule and repeated voting. The latter rule makes vote buying prohibitively costly.
Schlagwörter: 
vote-buying
political economy
poverty traps
economic development
voting rules
repeated voting
JEL: 
D72
I20
I30
O10
P16
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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