Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171537
Authors: 
Gersbach, Hans
Mühe, Felix
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series 08/94
Abstract: 
Vote-buying is widely used by parties in developing countries to influence the outcome of elections. We examine the impact of vote-buying on growth. We consider a model with a poverty trap where redistribution can promote growth. We show that vote-buying contributes to the persistence of poverty as taxed wealthy people buy votes from poor people. We then show that there exists a democratic constitution that breaks vote buying and promotes growth. Such a constitution involves rotating agenda setting, a taxpayer-protection rule and repeated voting. The latter rule makes vote buying prohibitively costly.
Subjects: 
vote-buying
political economy
poverty traps
economic development
voting rules
repeated voting
JEL: 
D72
I20
I30
O10
P16
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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