Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171523 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 08/80
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids. We compare the uniform price and the discriminatory auction in a setting of supply uncertainty. Uncertainty is caused by the interplay of two factors: the seller's private information about marginal cost, and the seller's incentive to sell the profit-maximizing quantity given the received bids. In every symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, bidders submit higher bids in the uniform price auction than in the discriminatory auction. In the two-bidder case this result extends to the set of rationalizable strategies. As a consequence, we find that the uniform price auction generates higher expected revenue for the seller and higher trade volume.
Schlagwörter: 
sealed bid multi-unit auctions
variable supply auctions
discriminatory and uniform price auctions
subgame perfect equilibria
rationalizable strategies
JEL: 
D44
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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