Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171517 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 07/74
Publisher: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Abstract: 
We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we ex- tend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential from cardinal to ordi- nal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordi- nal game is a best-response potential game if and only if it does not have a best-response cycle. Further, Milgrom and Shannon's concept of quasi- supermodularity is extended from cardinal games to ordinal games. We find that under certain compactness and semicontinuity assumptions, the ordinal Nash equilibria of a quasi-supermodular game form a nonempty complete lattice. Finally, we extend several set-valued solution concepts from cardinal to ordinal games in our sense.
Subjects: 
Ordinal Games
Potential Games
Quasi-Supermodularity
Rationalizable Sets
Sets Closed under Behavior Correspondences
JEL: 
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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