Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171513
Autoren: 
Fahrenberger, Theresa
Gersbach, Hans
Datum: 
2007
Reihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series 07/70
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects where the first-period project may have a long-lasting impact. In the first period a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting only voting losers keep the voting right in the second period. We show that as soon as absolute risk aversion exceeds a threshold value minority voting is superior to repeated application of the simple majority rule.
Schlagwörter: 
voting
minority
durable decision
risk aversion
tyranny of majority rules
JEL: 
D7
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
623.09 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.