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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 06/55
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes overlapping-generations models where natural capital is owned by selfish agents. Transfers in favor of young agents reduce the rate of depletion and increase output growth. It is shown that intergenerational transfers may be preferred to laissez-faire by an indefinite sequence of generations: if the resource share in production is sufficiently high, the welfare gain induced by preser- vation compensates for the loss due to taxation. This conclusion is reinforced when other assets are available, e.g. man-made capital, claims on monopoly rents, and R&D investment. Transfers raise the welfare of all generations, except that of the first resource owner: if resource endowments are taxed at time zero, all successive generations support resource-saving policies for purely selfish reasons.
Schlagwörter: 
Distortionary Taxation
Intergenerational Transfers
Overlapping Generations
Renewable Resources
Sustainability
Technological Change
JEL: 
H30
Q01
Q20
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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