Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171499
Authors: 
Valente, Simone
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series 06/55
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes overlapping-generations models where natural capital is owned by selfish agents. Transfers in favor of young agents reduce the rate of depletion and increase output growth. It is shown that intergenerational transfers may be preferred to laissez-faire by an indefinite sequence of generations: if the resource share in production is sufficiently high, the welfare gain induced by preser- vation compensates for the loss due to taxation. This conclusion is reinforced when other assets are available, e.g. man-made capital, claims on monopoly rents, and R&D investment. Transfers raise the welfare of all generations, except that of the first resource owner: if resource endowments are taxed at time zero, all successive generations support resource-saving policies for purely selfish reasons.
Subjects: 
Distortionary Taxation
Intergenerational Transfers
Overlapping Generations
Renewable Resources
Sustainability
Technological Change
JEL: 
H30
Q01
Q20
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
558.07 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.