Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171253 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Arbeitspapier No. 05/2017
Publisher: 
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Wiesbaden
Abstract: 
We propose a new identification strategy to assess the efficacy of macroprudential measures. We propose a novel instrumental variable that is based on the idea that a politically sensitive macroprudential measure is more likely to be implemented if a politically independent institution, such as a central bank, is in charge. Our results show that borrower-based macroprudential measures have had a strong and statistically significant dampening effect on credit growth in the European Union.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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