Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171209
Authors: 
Alexandron-Lavon, Anat
Epstein, Gil S.
Lindner Pomerantz, Renana
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
GLO Discussion Paper 141
Abstract: 
Reporters and editors may not have the same ideology. When an editor wants to employ a new reporter with a different ideology, they have to negotiate the price of moving from their own to the other's ideology. We focus on the job market for reporters, where the agents negotiate over the ideological position to be reported and wage. We adopt a spatial model in which each agent suffers a utility loss as the agreed-upon position moves away from his/her favored one. Equilibrium determines a threshold ideological gap for a match to be formed. Our analysis generates a natural separation between extreme, mildly extreme and moderate ideologies. Furthermore, we find that agents that hold extreme ideologies compromise less than moderates. This formulation may be applied to other situations in which agents involve monetary and non-monetary considerations, especially a preference for similarity.
Subjects: 
Media
Job Market
Ideological Position
JEL: 
J32
J44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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