Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171113
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6649
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We exploit a unique data set that features both un-intermediated mortgage requests and independent offers from multiple banks for each request. We show that households typically are not prudent risk managers but prioritize the minimization of current mortgage payments over the risk of possible hikes in future mortgage payments. We also provide evidence that banks do influence the contracted mortgage rate fixation periods, trading off their own exposure to interest rate risk against the borrowers’ affordability and credit risk. Our results challenge the implicit assumption of the existing mortgage choice literature whereby fixation periods are determined entirely by households.
Subjects: 
Fixed-Rate Mortgage (FRM)
Adjustable-Rate Mortgage (ARM)
fixation period
maturity mismatch
interest rate risk
credit risk
duration
JEL: 
D12
E43
G21
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.