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Autoren: 
Bernergard, Axel
Wärneryd, Karl
Datum: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6636
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice of contest, results in the allocation of players to contests that maximizes aggregate equilibrium effort. For a class of oligopoly models that are equivalent to contests, this implies output maximization.
Schlagwörter: 
contests
self-allocation
effort maximization
quantity competition
JEL: 
C72
D43
D44
D72
D74
L13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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