Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171100
Authors: 
Bernergard, Axel
Wärneryd, Karl
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6636
Abstract: 
We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice of contest, results in the allocation of players to contests that maximizes aggregate equilibrium effort. For a class of oligopoly models that are equivalent to contests, this implies output maximization.
Subjects: 
contests
self-allocation
effort maximization
quantity competition
JEL: 
C72
D43
D44
D72
D74
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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