Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171095 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6631
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies a contracting problem where agents’ cost of actions is private information. With two actions, this leads to a two-dimensional screening problem with moral hazard. There is a natural one-dimensional ordering of types when there is both adverse selection and moral hazard. Regardless of the number of types, an optimal menu of contracts either pools every type together or offers a menu of two contracts. Any incentive-compatible menu of contracts has to satisfy pairwise single-crossing properties in incentivized actions and ex-ante utilities. The principal can no longer sell the firm to the agent.
Schlagwörter: 
adverse selection
moral hazard
multidimensional types
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
297.88 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.