Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/170994 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 11010
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper shows that the reforms which expanded short-time work in France after the great 2008-2009 recession were largely to the benefit of large firms which are recurrent short-time work users. We argue that this expansion of short-time work is an inefficient way to provide insurance to workers, as it entails cross-subsidies which reduce aggregate production. An efficient policy should provide unemployment insurance benefits funded by experience rated employers' contributions instead of short-time work benefits. We find that short-time work entails significant production losses compared to an unemployment insurance scheme with experience rating.
Subjects: 
short-time work
unemployment insurance
experience rating
JEL: 
J63
J65
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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