Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/170828
Authors: 
Checchi, Daniele
De Poli, Silvia
Rettore, Enrico
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 10844
Abstract: 
We study a reform occurred in Italy in 2008 in the formation of selection committees for qualifying as university professor. Prior to the reform members of the selection committees were elected by their peers, after the reform they have been randomly drawn. This policy was intended to increase the equality of opportunities of candidates via a reduction of the role played by connections to commissioners. Results show that the reform was ineffective in reducing the probability contribution of being an insider, but attenuated the impact of being connected to a commissioner without significantly raising the impact of scientific quality of candidates on the outcome of competitions. We also find that candidates internalised the changed environment and adapted their strategy of application.
Subjects: 
university recruitment
incentives
negotiation
formal procedures
JEL: 
M51
I23
D82
J45
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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