Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/170671
Autoren: 
Kuhn, Thomas
Pestow, Radomir
Zenker, Anja
Datum: 
2017
Reihe/Nr.: 
Chemnitz Economic Papers 011
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we discuss the endogenous formation of climate coalitions in the tradition of the issue-linkage literature. In particular, we propose a preferential free trade agreement on which a climate coalition should be built. The basic idea is that the benefits of free trade provide strong incentives for free riders to join the coalition. As a framework, a multi-stage strategic trade model is used in which a country may discourage greenhouse gas emissions by setting an emissions cap effective on a permit market. In addition, a discriminatory import tariff is imposed on dirty goods. However, at the heart of our approach are the trade privileges granted to coalition members shifting the terms of trade favourably without prodiving incentives towards eco-dumping. As a main result, we find that trade liberalisation is much more effective in building climate coalitions than a single-issue environmental agreement. The parametrical simulation of the model in particular shows that participation in joint emission reduction is higher, consumption patterns are more environmentally friendly, and coalitional welfare is improved. As a policy implication, negotiations on climate treaties and free trade arrangements should be integrated.
Schlagwörter: 
Climate Change
International Environmental Agreements
Free Trade
Issue Linkage
Tradable Permits
Strategic Trade Policy
JEL: 
Q54
Q56
F18
F15
Q58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Nennungen in sozialen Medien:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.47 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.