Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/170651 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 54
Publisher: 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE), Milano
Abstract: 
This paper studies the role of council size on government corruption in Brazil. We leverage on the discontinuous relationship between the population size of municipalities and council size dictated by the law to implement a regression discontinuity design. We document a substantial positive causal effect of the number of city councilors on the incidence of corruption detected during federal audits. Results also show that hav- ing an extra councilor does not affect the size of the public budget, but in uences its composition. It increases expenditures related to public housing and recreation, which we interpret as items related to clientelis- tic policies. Finally, we find a negative relationship between council size and its productivity: namely, the numbers of legislative bills proposed by councilor and approved are both lower in municipalities with larger councils.
Subjects: 
Corruption
Council Size
Regression Discontinuity
JEL: 
D72
D73
H72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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