Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/170648
Authors: 
Lucifora, Claudio
Tonello, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE), Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore 51
Abstract: 
The diffusion of evaluation programs, along with the higher stake they account for, has also increased the prevalence of opportunistic behavior and cheating practices. This paper investigates the efficacy of different policy measures aimed at fighting cheating behaviors in schools. We exploit a classroom-based randomized experiment in Italian public schools, which assigned an external inspector to monitor the administration and marking of the tests, as well as different sanctioning mechanisms for schools suspect of cheating. We find that higher monitoring is effective in deterring cheating at all grades, while sanctions in general have no effect, and, under specific circumstances, may also trigger schools' strategic behaviors, such as selective pooling. The ineffectiveness of sanctioning schemes is explained by the fact that they are not embedded in a proper school accountability system.
Subjects: 
cheating
monitoring
incentives
JEL: 
I21
I28
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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