Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/170625 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 28
Verlag: 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We present a network model of the interbank market in which optimizing risk averse banks lend to each other and invest in non-liquid assets. Market clearing takes place through a tâtonnement process which yields the equilibrium price, while traded quantities are determined by means of a matching algorithm. We compare three alternative matching algorithms: maximum entropy, closest matching and random matching. Contagion occurs through liquidity hoarding, interbank interlinkages and fire sale externalities. The resulting network configurations exhibits a core-periphery structure, dis-assortative behavior and low clustering coefficient. We measure systemic importance by means of network centrality and input-output metrics and the contribution of systemic risk by means of Shapley values. Within this framework we analyze the effects of prudential policies on the stability/efficiency trade-off. Liquidity requirements unequivocally decrease systemic risk but at the cost of lower efficiency (measured by aggregate investment in non-liquid assets); equity requirements tend to reduce risk (hence increase stability) without reducing significantly overall investment.
Schlagwörter: 
banking networks
centrality metrics
systemic risk
JEL: 
D85
G21
G28
C63
L14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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