Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/170567 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Verlag: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel und Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
The purpose of this note is to explore the problem of non-convex labor supply decision in an economy with imperfect observability of work e ffort, and the need to use e fficiency wages to prevent shirking as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). In addition, the paper and explicitly performs the aggregation presented in Vasilev (2017) without a formal proof, and thus provide - starting from micro-foundations - the derivation of the expected utility functions used for the aggregate household. We show how lotteries as in Rogerson (1988) can be used to convexify consumption sets, and aggregate over individual preferences. With a discrete labor supply decisions, the elasticity of aggregate labor supply increases from unity to infinity.
Schlagwörter: 
Aggregation
Indivisible Labor
non-convexities
shirking
efficiency wages
JEL: 
E1
J22
J41
Dokumentart: 
Preprint

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
170.28 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.