Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/170567 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Publisher: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel und Hamburg
Abstract: 
The purpose of this note is to explore the problem of non-convex labor supply decision in an economy with imperfect observability of work e ffort, and the need to use e fficiency wages to prevent shirking as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). In addition, the paper and explicitly performs the aggregation presented in Vasilev (2017) without a formal proof, and thus provide - starting from micro-foundations - the derivation of the expected utility functions used for the aggregate household. We show how lotteries as in Rogerson (1988) can be used to convexify consumption sets, and aggregate over individual preferences. With a discrete labor supply decisions, the elasticity of aggregate labor supply increases from unity to infinity.
Subjects: 
Aggregation
Indivisible Labor
non-convexities
shirking
efficiency wages
JEL: 
E1
J22
J41
Document Type: 
Preprint

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