Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/170492
Authors: 
Gallier, Carlo
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 17-038
Abstract: 
I investigate if, how, and why the effect of a contribution rule in a public goods game depends on how it is implemented: endogenously chosen or externally imposed. The rule prescribes full contributions to the public good backed by a nondeterrent sanction for those who do not comply. My experimental design allows me to disentangle to what extent the effect of the contribution rule under democracy is driven by self-selection of treatments, information transmitted via the outcome of the referendum, and democracy per se. In case treatments are endogenously chosen via a democratic decision-making process, the contribution rule significantly increases contributions to the public good. However, democratic participation does not affect participants' contribution behavior directly, after controlling for self-selection of treatments and the information transmitted by voting.
Subjects: 
laboratory experiment
public good
democracy
endogenous institutions
voting
contribution rule
compliance
JEL: 
C91
D02
D72
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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