Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/169083
Authors: 
Burlea, Adriana Schiopoiu
Remmé, Joop
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Amfiteatru Economic Journal [ISSN:] 2247-9104 [Volume:] 19 [Year:] 2017 [Issue:] 45 [Pages:] 464-476
Abstract: 
Taking into account that it is in the nature of the modern corporat ion that risks are distributed over several agents, we discuss in this paper the organisational behaviour as it results from such dispersal of responsibilities for both the principal and the agent. We explore the hypothesis that dispersal of responsibilities could be the result or a cause of a lack of consensus between the principal and the agent. Our findings suggest that a dispersal of responsibilities has a negative impact on the principal-agent relationship and that it represents a foundation for theoretical and empirical approaches to organisational behaviour. We find that agent perceptions of a dispersal of responsibilities are linked to his/her resistance to the principal’s interests, but this relationship is deeper than was suggested by previous research. However, if the sharing of responsibilities does not run parallel to that, we may have as a result what we call an agency problem.
Subjects: 
dispersal of responsibilities
agency theory
risk
information asymmetry
JEL: 
M51
M59
L22
L29
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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