Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168295
Authors: 
Engelmann, Dirk
Grüner, Hans Peter
Hoffmann, Timo
Possajennikov, Alex
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Experiments - Games IV F01-V2
Abstract: 
In democracies, an absolute majority of the population may choose policies that are harmful to the rest of the population. A purpose of super-majority rules is to prevent this from happening. We study whether individuals optimally choose sub- or super-majority rules when the rights of minorities should be protected. Subjects propose more extreme voting rules for more skewed distributions, but we also find that rule choices are biased towards balanced rules, leading substantial welfare losses.
JEL: 
C91
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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