Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168285
Authors: 
Friebel, Guido
Heinz, Matthias
Krueger, Miriam
Zubanov, Nikolay
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Applied Microeconomics III G01-V1
Abstract: 
In a field experiment with a retail chain (1,300 employees, 193 shops), randomly selected sales teams received a bonus. The bonus increases both sales and number of customers dealt with by 3%. Each dollar spent on the bonus generates $3.80 in sales, and $2.10 in profit. Wages increase by 2.2% while inequality rises only moderately. The analysis suggests effort complementarities to be important, and the effectiveness of peer pressure in overcoming free-riding to be limited. After rolling out the bonus, treatment and control shops’ performance converge, suggesting long-term stability of the treatment effect.
Subjects: 
management practices
randomized controlled trial (RCT)
field experiment
insider econometrics
wage inequality
JEL: 
J3
L2
M5
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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