Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168283
Authors: 
Fleckinger, Pierre
Mimra, Wanda
Zago, Angelo
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Incomplete Information Games A09-V2
Abstract: 
We build a model of collective reputation under moral hazard to analyze incentives under collective reputation. Producers can produce high quality, but it is only imperfectly detected. Products not detected as of high quality are pooled by to the collective reputation structure. Collective reputation can yield higher quality and welfare than individual reputation. While groups unravel in absence of transfers even when efficient, simple collective reputation contracts implement the First Best.
JEL: 
D82
D47
D71
L15
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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