Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168269
Authors: 
Gretschko, Vitali
Wambach, Achim
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Contract Theory G09-V2
Abstract: 
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any outcome of any mechanism. We provide a general characterization of renegotiation-proof outcomes. We apply the solution to a setting with a continuous type space, private values and non-linear contracts. We find that the optimal renegotiation-proof outcomes for the principal are pooling outcomes and satisfy a “no-distortion-at-the-bottom” property.
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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