Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168258
Authors: 
Reif, Simon
Wichert, Sebastian
Wuppermann, Amelie
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Postersession P00-V10
Abstract: 
Birth weight manipulation is common in DRG systems. Hospitals receive more money for cases with weight below certain thresholds, which could benefit newborns. Also, some reimbursement thresholds overlap with diagnostic thresholds that have been shown to affect medical care. Based on all hospital births in Germany from 2005-2011, we investigate whether this triggers different care. We find that this is not the case, suggesting that financial incentives do not directly impact care for newborns.
JEL: 
I110
I180
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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