Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168231
Authors: 
Wolff, Irenaeus
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Experiments - Games III D18-V3
Abstract: 
I show that whether participants generally believe in others’ preference stability is a crucial determinant of behaviour. Whether a participant’s behaviour can be predicted by her best-response or a Nash-equilibrium in a context where she can observe others' elicited preferences depends heavily both on the participant having stable preferences and on her generally believing in others’ preference stability. The latter is true because such a belief is associated with less dispersed beliefs.
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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