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Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Auctions No. E09-V1
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel, Hamburg
Procurement regulation aimed at curbing discrimination requires equal treatment of sellers. However, Deb and Pai (2016) show that such regulation poses virtually no restriction on the ability to discriminate. We propose a simple rule – imitation perfection – that restricts discrimination significantly. With homogeneous bidders, imitation perfection implies that all bidders earn the same surplus in every equilibrium conditional on their valuation.
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