Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168144
Authors: 
Naseer, Shaheen
Heine, Klaus
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Lobbying and Interest Groups D20-V2
Abstract: 
The paper proposes a theoretical framework to explain policy drift, when identity moderates the principle-agent relation between the legislator and the bureaucracy. Our model points to the subtle interaction between different administrative levels of bureaucracy and how this interaction shapes the structure and size of budgetary allocations. Conceptually we enrich the public choice tradition of modeling bureaucracies by insights which fall broadly into the study of organizational behavior.
JEL: 
D73
H11
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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