Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168113
Authors: 
Sahm, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Auctions B09-V1
Abstract: 
I examine sequential round-robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players which are matched once with each other. If the matches are organized as Tullock contests (all-pay auctions), the tournament is almost fair (highly discriminatory): Subject to the position of their matches in the sequence of the tournament, the differences in players’ ex ante winning probabilities and expected payoffs are small (large). Discrepancy results from a higher discriminating power of the all-pay auction.
JEL: 
C72
D72
Z20
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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